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Abstract. IETF is standardizing a key establishment protocol named
EDHOC for constrained IoT devices [25]. In contrast tomore powerful IoT
devices, such as web cameras and cars, which receive most attention from
media, constrained devices often have severe restrictions on energy con-
sumption. Additionally, they often use specialized wireless communication
links with demanding constraints on message sizes, which may also vary
between messages. EDHOCwas first formally analyzed by Bruni et. al. [3].
Since then, the protocol has been significantly extended and is nowa frame-
work with a number of cryptographic cores, called methods. The initial
version of EDHOC contained only two out of the current fivemethods [24].
In this paper we formally analyze all methods of EDHOC in a symbolic
Dolev-Yao model, using the Tamarin verification tool. We show that the
different methods provide sensible, but also rather heterogeneous security
properties, and discuss consequences of this.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
IoT security threats involving cars, web-cameras and other resourceful devices
receive most attention frommedia and academia. These devices are computation-
ally strongwith no severe bandwidth or energy consumption restrictions. Securing
the communication between such devices can readily be done using (D)TLS. Con-
strained devices, on the other hand, on which bandwidth and energy consumption
restrictions are common, have received much less attention. These devices may be
simple sensors with the only task of relaying measurements of their physical envi-
ronment to a server every hour, but doing so autonomously for a decade without
maintenance. To keep energy consumption down, highly specialized radio links
with small and heterogeneous frame sizes are sometimes used. IETF defined the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) protocol for data transport in such
situations [27]. CoAP does not include security protection on its own. In some
cases, (D)TLS messages are too large to fit into the radio frames. This is one of
2 K. Norrman et al.
the reasons IETF standardized the Object Security for Constrained RESTful En-
vironments (OSCORE) protocol to secure communications between constrained
devices, as a complement for when (D)TLS is too heavy weight [26].
The OSCORE protocol requires a pre-established security context. For a cou-
ple of years, the IETF LightweightAuthenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) working
grouphas been developing requirements andmechanisms for a key exchangeproto-
col, named EDHOC [25], capable of establishing OSCORE security contexts. Nat-
urally, EDHOCmust work under the same constrained requirements as OSCORE
itself.
While use cases for EDHOC are not firmly set, the overall goal of EDHOC is
to establish an OSCORE security context, keeping messages small being the most
prominent driver for the design. Discussions on the LAKE working group mailing
list explored whether a compressed version of TLS, named cTLS [19], would suffice
for the same situations that the combination of OSCORE and EDHOC aim for.
They concluded to proceed developing EDHOC in parallel to the TLS working
groups efforts to develop cTLS.
The EDHOC protocol has evolved significantly over time to cater for smaller
messages and more use cases. The first incarnation of EDHOC appeared in March
2016. It contained two different cryptographic cores, one based on a pre-shared key
Diffie-Hellman and a second following a draft of the challenge-response signatures,
in the style of the Noise framework [17]. The latter was then replaced by SIGMA,
and this version, from May 2018, was formally analyzed by Bruni et. al. [3]. The
protocol has now further evolved and variants using challenge-response signatures
have been added again by integrating the cryptographic core of OPTLS. On top of
this, mixed variants where one party uses a challenge-response signature and the
other a regular signature have also been added. Consequently, there are now five
cryptographic cores in total, and it is prudent to formally analyze them all to en-
sure a higher level of security assurance for EDHOC. This is especially important,
since the specification itself lacks a description of the intended security model and
overall security goals. Discussing how this gap can be filled, and how to identify
what the expected security goals should be, is an important part of this paper.
1.2 Contributions
We have reviewed and analyzed the EDHOC protocol, which has continuously
evolved, at times based on our feedback. The analysis spanned over roughly five
months, but the formal models and proven properties are based on to the version
specified in the draft as it was 2020-03-01 [25].
Our main contributions are the following.
– We provide formalization of all five cryptographic cores of EDHOC using
Tamarin [16].
– We give an explicit security model for the protocol and have verified essen-
tial security properties, such as session key and entity authentication, as well
as Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), within that model. From these explicitly
proven properties other properties follow, e.g., session key independence.
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– We discuss the relation between proven properties, potentially missing prop-
erties and the lack of clear design goals and security model for EDHOC. Based
on this we give recommendations for the future standards development in re-
gards to clarity, not only in terms of under which technical restrictions the
protocol must work, but also what its envisioned uses are.
– Our discussions withmembers of the IETF LAKEworking group have already
lead to improvements and clarifications of the standard specification based on
observations we made during the construction of our formal model.
1.3 Related work
The work closest to ours is Bruni et. al. [3], which used ProVerif [2] to analyze
an earlier, two-cryptographic core, version of EDHOC [24]. We consider our work
to be a sort of follow-up to that, doing a similar kind of analysis of the most re-
cent, and more elaborate, version of EDHOC with its five cores. We do, however,
take a clean slate approach and look at the protocol as new. For example, since
the model has undergone so much change, the set of properties which we verify
is also different. The Tamarin tool has been used to verify many other protocols,
perhaps closest to our work is Cremers et. al’s analysis of TLS [6]. Some of the
cryptographic cores themselves have been analyzed in the computational model,
e.g., SIGMA by Canetti and Krawczyk [4], OPTLS by Krawczyk and Wee [13],
and Noise by Kobeissi et. al. [9]. Computational models often rely on implicit
session key authentication (see for example the definition of SK-security in the
Canetti-Krawczyk model [4]). Although symbolic models predominantly rely on
correspondence properties in the style of Lowe [14], there are examples where
implicit authentication has been used. For example, Schmidt et. al. [23] use a
symbolized version of an extended Canetti-Krawzcyk model.
2 The EDHOC protocol
The purpose of EDHOC is to establish an authenticated security context for the
OSCORE security protocol. Parties in the EDHOC protocol can authenticate
themselves to peers using one out of three authentication methods – digital sig-
natures (SIG), challenge-response signatures based on static Diffie-Hellman keys
(STAT) or pre-shared symmetric keys (PSK). We will refer to these authentication
methods simply as methods below.
Four combinations of the SIG and STAT authentication methods are possible
for the two parties, while the PSK authentication method can only be run by a
party when the other party is also authenticating with a PSK. We refer to these
combinations also as methods, denoted SIG-SIG, SIG-STAT, STAT-STAT, STAT-SIG and
PSK-PSK. We refer to a method where at least one party uses SIG as a SIG-based
method and similarly for STAT and PSK. Although the terminology is overloaded,
it should be clear from the context whether a single agent authentication method
or a combined method is intended.
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We describe each of these methods in detail later in this section. The SIG-
based methods of EDHOC are derived from SIGMA-I, a variant of the SIGMA
protocol which provides identity protection for the initiator. However, EDHOC
deviates from SIGMA-I in several aspects, e.g., EDHOC uses Mac-then-Sign like
TLS instead of Sign-then-Mac. The STAT-based methods use challenge-response
signatures using static Diffie-Hellman keys, and proceed along the lines of OPTLS.
The challenge-response signatures use ephemeralDiffie-Hellman keys as challenges
and an AEAD MAC to protect the data to be signed [20,15,13].
2.1 Relations to SIGMA, OPTLS and Noise
SIGMA As noted above, the SIG-SIG method of EDHOC is a very close deriva-
tive of SIGMA-I and the version from EDHOC v08 [24] was carefully analyzed
by Bruni et. al. [3], as was the PSK-PSK method of that version of EDHOC. Since
both of these methods are close in spirit to the versions already analyzed in that
paper, we will not focus on those in the remainder of this paper. We do however
model them to the same extent and verify their properties with the same care as
the other methods.
OPTLS OPTLS [12] is a key-exchange protocol developed with the intention to
serve as a basis for the handshake protocol in TLS 1.3. OPTLS is a one round-trip
protocol providing server to client authentication, but not vice versa. The server
has a secret static key s and a public static DH key gs. The client first sends to the
server a challengemessage composed of a fresh nonce and some negotiated param-
eters, along with an ephemeral DH key gx. The server responds with a nonce of its
own, some other negotiated parameters, an ephemeral DH key gy, and a MAC of
all these values computed using a key derived from gxs. At the end of the protocol,
a session key is derived by each party from gxs and gxy. The former ensures secrecy
for as long as s remains secret, and the latter provides perfect forward secrecy in
case s is compromised. The core idea is that, when receiving the response message,
the client deduces that only the intended server could have computed gxs with the
knowledge of s, and from gxs and gxy derived theMACkey.Under this assumption,
the client further deduces that anything covered by the MAC originated from the
intended server. This construction is sometimes referred to as a challenge-response
signature. It is very efficient in terms of the number of transmitted bits.
In EDHOC, a party authenticating with with the STAT method essentially acts
as anOPTLS client and the other party as anOPTLS server. There are differences,
e.g., that EDHOC reuses the gx as a nonce, while OPTLS makes an explicit point
about keeping these as separate elements. The STAT-STAT method can be thought
of as interleaving two OPTLS sessions, where the second EDHOCmessage carries
both the response message of the first OPTLS session and the request message of
the second OPTLS session.
Noise For the STAT-STAT method, since both parties are running a STAT method,
there is an obvious analogue in terms of the Noise framework [17]. Noise is a frame-
work for a certain class of security protocols where all parties authenticate using
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static DH keys, and whose structure alsomeets certain requirements of encryption
etc.
The closest Noise “pattern” to the STAT-STAT method of EDHOC is the XX
pattern. It can be seen that the first two messages in this method of EDHOC
correspond perfectly to the first two messages of the XX pattern of the Noise
framework. However, in the third message, the XX pattern requires the initiator
to send their static key, followed by an encrypted payload using a key derived by
a combination of the static key and an ephemeral key. In EDHOC, the static key
and the payload are both encrypted in the same key, one depending on the key
used for the second message, and on the static key of the initiator. This perhaps
diverges from the XX pattern of Noise, and one can no longer directly claim that
EDHOC enjoys the same properties as XX. As a potential direction for future
work, we relegate the further investigation of this pattern of the Noise framework
to determine any correspondence with the STAT-STAT method.
2.2 Methods and features of EDHOC
We are now ready to dive into the details of the various methods supported by
EDHOC. Note that there are some fundamental components that are common
to all the EDHOCmethods. These components are the aforementioned COSE ob-
jects, AEAD encryption [20], and, perhaps most importantly, the key derivation
function (KDF) utilized to generate pseudorandom strings and encryption/de-
cryption keys. We give a quick introduction to the COSE objects and the AEAD
algorithm for the sake of completeness, and we then flesh out the workings of
the KDF, before moving on to discuss the overall structure and the details of the
various methods.
2.3 EDHOC building blocks
EDHOC is constructed using several underlying components. For example, it uses
COSE for cryptographic operations, which in turn uses AEAD for authenticated
encryption. We briefly describe the most important components in this section.
Sub protocols and encodings To achieve small message sizes and reuse im-
plementations often supported by constrained IoT devices [21,22], EDHOC uses
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) for data encoding and CBOR
Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for cryptographic operations.
CBOR is a data format designed for small code size and small message size.
COSE is used to create andprocess signatures,MACs, and encryptionusingCBOR
to encode and decode input and output objects.
All COSE objects (also called structures) are built using the CBORarray type.
All objects share in common the first three elements of the array. These are the
set of protected header parameters (these are the parameters that ought to be
cryptographically protected), the set of unprotected header parameters, and the
content (plaintext or ciphertext, depending on the type of COSE object) of the
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message. Header parameters include the cryptographic algorithm to be used, con-
tent type, parameters for identifying a cryptographic key etc. The algorithm to be
used might need to be authenticated, and therefore put in protected parameters,
while content type indicates the type of data in the payload or ciphertext fields,
and can remain unprotected.
The other elements of the CBOR array may vary, depending on the kind of
COSE structure being considered (determined by the operation performed, and
algorithm used). COSE supports many different kinds of structures, for signa-
tures, encryption etc. We will encounter only two kinds of COSE objects as part
of the description of EDHOC, namely the COSE Encrypt0 (the 0 indicates that
the recipient is implicitly identified by the key) and Cose Sign1 (the 1 indicates
that there can only be one signer) objects.
A COSE Encrypt0 structure is a CBOR array with (as mentioned above) a
field for protected data, a field for externally supplied application data, and a field
for the ciphertext. It also contains a text field which contains the string “Encrypt0”
to denote the use of the method with implicit recipient. All these fields store the
corresponding bitstrings.
Similarly, a Cose Sign1 structure contains protected data, unprotected data,
and the plaintext to be signed. It also contains a text field which contains the
string “Signature1”, and a field for the actual signature.
One of the features offered in the COSE document is the ability for applica-
tions to provide additional data to be authenticated, which is not carried as part
of the COSE object. Applications that use this feature need to define how such
externally supplied authenticated data is to be constructed. Therefore, both these
objects can also carry some such external data along with (but separate from)
their other contents.
AEAD Authenticated encryptionwith associateddata, or AEAD, is, as the name
suggests, an operation that provides both data authentication and encryption [20].
The encryption algorithm takes in a key, a unique nonce, a plaintext, and some
associated data, and outputs a ciphertext. The plaintext is both authenticated and
encrypted, while the associated data is merely authenticated. The ciphertext is at
least as long as the plaintext. When the plaintext is empty, the AEAD encryption
algorithm acts as a MAC on the associated data.
The associated data field contains information which it might be desirable
to authenticate, but must be left unencrypted to allow the system to function
properly. Authentication of associated data is provided without including it in the
ciphertext. The AEAD decryption operation returns the decrypted ciphertext if
the MAC verifies. If the MAC fails to verify, the operation returns nothing.
Key derivation function (KDF) and key hierarchy One of the most im-
portant building blocks for EDHOC is the key derivation function HKDF [11].
HKDF provides two functions in its interface, HKDF-extract, which is intended
to construct a uniformly distributed key material, and HKDF-expand, which is
used to generate keys from the key material. The keys are then used as input to
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encryption and integrity protection algorithms. When deriving key material and
keys, they can be bound to various parameters, which are input into the functions
in the form of a seed. Both these functions are based on HMAC [10], which is a
cryptographic hash function.
EDHOC keys form a hierarchy, which we now outline in simplified form. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the simplified version of the key hierarchy.The key hierarchy is rooted
in an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key gxy. From this key three intermediate keys are
derived in a chain, one associated with the second message, PRK 2e, one associated
with message three, PRK 3e2m, and a finally one from which the final session key
material is derived, PRK 4x3m. The seed used for PRK 2e is dependent on which
method is used. When PSK-PSK is used, the pre-shared key is used as salt. For all
other methods the salt is empty.
For the PSK-PSK and SIG-SIG methods, all three intermediate keys are the same,
i.e., PRK 2e = PRK 3e2m = PRK 4x3m. For the three STAT-based methods, however,
they differ. The differences comes from that when a party uses STAT-based authen-
tication, the intermediate key PRK 3e2m is dependent on the static long term key
of the party (possibly both) using STAT-based authentication.
The keys used for the AEAD encryptions are augmented with the suffix ‘e’, for
encrypting the ciphertext, or with the suffix ‘m’, for generating the MAC (MACs
only feature in the methods involving asymmetric keys). There are four keys –
K 2m, K 2e, K 3m, and K 3ae. The suffixes in the names of the keys indicate which
intermediate keys they are used to generate. PRK 2e is used to generate the key
K 2e along with the appropriate transaction hash. PRK 3e2m is used for the keys
K 2m and K 3ae, while PRK 4x3m is used to generate K 3m.
We now discuss each of the EDHOC methods in detail over the next few sec-
tions.
2.4 PSK-PSK method
In this method, the initiator and responder are assumed to have a pre-shared key
(PSK) which is secret to them, and can be retrieved by the responder using a public
part of the first message (ID PSK). This method corresponds to the symmetric key
method of EDHOC v08.
In the firstmessage, the initiator sends amessage consisting of parameters iden-
tifying the method and the correlation technique used (Method), the cipher suites
ranked in order of preference (wewill comeback to this later, in Section 2.7), the ini-
tiator’s ephemeral key (G X), their connection identifier (C I), the ID PSK identifier,
and (optional) auxiliary data (AD 1). The responder, upon receipt of this message,
must verify that the selected cipher suite is supported (see Section 2.7 for a descrip-
tion of how this is done), and pass AD 1 to the security application which needs it.
The secondmessage, sent by the responder, is composed of C I, the responder’s
ephemeral key G Y, their connection identifier C R, and a COSE object. This con-
tains as external data the transaction hash of the first message (TH 2), along with
an AEAD encryption of the (optional) auxiliary data AD 2. The key used for this
(K 2ae) is derived using the EDHOC key derivation function with TH 2 and the in-
termediate keyPRK 2e as input, while the associateddata for theAEAD encryption
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g
xy
HKDF-extract
PRK 2e
HKDF-extract
PRK 3e2m
HKDF-extract
PRK 4x3mHKDF-expandK 3m
HKDF-expandK 2m
HKDF-expandK 2e
HKDF-expandK 3ae
Initial salt
Additional
input
Additional
input
TH 2
TH 2
TH 3
Fig. 1. A diagram to illustrate the KDF key hierarchy
is constructed by concatenating a constant empty string and TH 2. Recall that the
PRKs in this method are constructed by running HKDF-extract using PSK as salt.
The initiator, upon receipt of this message, sends backC R, followed by a COSE
object containing an AEAD encryption of auxiliary data AD 3, along with the hash
of TH 2 and the encryption object received from the responder (which is referred
to as TH 3) as external data. There is no protected data for this encryption. As
earlier, the key used (K 3ae) is derived by supplying TH 3 and PRK 3e2m (which is
the same as PRK 2e, for this method) as input to the KDF, and the associated data
is TH 3. An abstract description is shown in Figure 2.
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Initiator
Knows g, PSK, ID PSK, AD 1, AD 3
Responder
Knows g, PSK, ID PSK, AD 2
Generates Method, Suites I, C I, x
G X=gx
m1: Method, Suites I, G X, C I, ID PSK, AD 1
Generates C R, y
G Y=gy
TH 2=H(m1,gy)
PRK 2e=HKDF-extract(PSK,gxy)
K 2ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 2e,TH 2)
m2: C I, G Y, C R,
cipher 2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
AEAD(K 2ae;TH 2,AD 2)
TH 2=H(m1,G Y)
PRK 2e=HKDF-extract(PSK,gxy)
K 2ae=HKDF(PRK 2e,TH 2)
TH 3=H(TH 2,cipher 2)
PRK 3e2m=PRK 2e
K 3ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 3)
m3: C R, AEAD(K 3ae; TH 3; AD 3)
PRK 3e2m=PRK 2e
K 3ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 3)
Fig. 2. The PSK-PSK method of EDHOC. AEAD(x;y;z) is used to denote AEAD encryp-
tion where x is the key, y is a tuple of the protected and external data, and z is the
plaintext.
2.5 STAT-based methods
EDHOC allows for three STAT-based methods – two where only one participant
has a static Diffie-Hellman key (while the other uses signatures), and one where
both do.
In the first message, the initiator includes an identifier for the method, a
preference-ordered list of cipher suites, their ephemeral key G X, their connec-
tion identifier C I, and some optional plaintext AD 1. This message is common to
all the four methods below involving asymmetric keys.
The responder, upon receipt, verifies the cipher suites, passes any AD 1 to the
application that needs it, and proceeds to construct and send the second message.
This message contains (not necessarily all of) C I, G Y, C R, and an encrypted term.
The initiator, upon getting this message, sends out a message containing an en-
crypted term.Depending on themethods being run by the initiator and responder,
the exact contents of these messages may vary. We will now describe each of these
methods and the second and third messages therein in detail.
SIG-STAT The initiator runs a SIGMA-based method, with signatures, while the
responder operates with a static Diffie-Hellman key andMACs. Both the initiator
and the responder generate ephemeral secrets x and y, and also have their respec-
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tive long term public-private authentication keypairs. The public authentication
keys have identifiers for retrieval as well.
The responder generates an ephemeral secret y, and an identifier C R. Then,
it generates the intermediate key. PRK 2e is obtained, as mentioned earlier, by
running the KDF algorithm on the empty salt and the shared secret gxy. Then,
PRK 3e2mis obtained by running the KDF algorithmon PRK 2e andG RX– this is the
result of raising the initiator’s ECDH ephemeral public key G X to the responder’s
long term key ltk R. These intermediate keys will be used to generate encryption
keys for this message.
The encrypted term for the second message is constructed as follows. First,
we build the COSE object that is the inner MAC, since the responder runs STAT.
The protected part of this object is an identifier for retrieving the responder’s
public authentication key, namely ID CRED R 5. The externally supplied data is
the transaction hash TH 2 (obtained by hashing the first message and G Y), the
responder’s public authentication key CRED R, and (optional) auxiliary data AD 2.
The plaintext is empty. The key used for the encryption K 2m is the output of the
KDF on being fed as input the intermediate keys PRK 3e2m and TH 2. The resulting
encrypted object is now referred to as the ciphertext MAC 2.
For the outer encryption object, we consider the plaintext formed by concate-
nating the bitstrings corresponding to the identifier for CRED R, MAC 2, and AD 2
(if any). The ciphertext is obtained by performing an XOR operation on this plain-
text with the key K 2e, which is obtained by using the KDF on PRK 2e and the
transaction hash TH 2. The responder therefore sends to the initiator G Y, C R, and
this ciphertext as the second message.
First the initiator generates PRK 2e, using the same arguments to the KDF as
the responder did above. For PRK 3e2m, however, the initiator sends to the KDF
PRK 2e and G RX – this G RX is obtained by exponentiating CRED R, the public au-
thentication key of the responder, to the initiator’s ephemeral secret x. Note that
this will be used to generate a key to decrypt the innerMAC 2 sent by the responder,
and therefore is asymmetric in nature to the G RX used by the responder above.
PRK 4x3m is set equal to PRK 3e2m.
It then sends the third message, consisting of C R, and an encrypted object.
Here, again, we first build the inner COSE object. This process is analogous to
that employed by the responder for the second message. The COSE object has
as protected data an identifier for retrieving the initiator’s public authentication
key CRED I. The externally supplied data is the transaction hash TH 3of the second
message and TH 2, the initator’s public authentication key CRED I, and (optional)
auxiliary data AD 3. The key used is K 3m, obtained by inputing the intermediate
5 The ID CRED R parameter may be used by the initiator to look up the responder’s static
public key. While there need not be a unique correspondence between ID CRED R and
the actual CRED R used by the responder, the initiator should be able to go through
the list of matches to look up and obtain the “correct” CRED R. Similarly for the
responder with ID CRED I and CRED I. However, in our modelling, we choose to model
the map from ID CRED R to CRED R (and that from ID CRED I to CRED I) as unique.
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key PRK 3e2m and TH 3. The resulting encrypted object is now referred to as the
ciphertext MAC 3.
Since the initiator is running SIG, this COSE object needs to be signed. To the
signing algorithm, the initiator sends as protected data the identifier for retrieving
CRED I, as external data the concatenation of TH 3, CRED I, and any AD 3, and the
payload MAC 3. This is signed using the private authentication key of the initiator.
We now construct the encryption for the thirdmessage, by passing to anAEAD
encryption algorithm a COSE object with no protected data, external data TH 3,
and a plaintext obtained by concatenating the identifier for retrieving CRED I, the
signed object described above, and AD 3. The key used for encryption is K 3ae, ob-
tained by running the KDF on the intermediate key PRK 3e2m and TH 2. Thus, the
message sent by the initiator to the responder in the third step is C R accompanied
by this encrypted object. This method is illustrated in Figure 3.
Initiator
Knows g, CRED I, ltk I, ID CRED I,
ID CRED R,AD 1, AD 3
Responder
Knows g, CRED R, ltk R, ID CRED R,
ID CRED I,AD 2
Generates Method, Suites I, C I, x
G X=gx
m1: Method, Suites I, G X, C I, AD 1
Generates C R, y
G Y=gy
TH 2=H(m1,〈C I,G Y,C R〉)
PRK 2e=HKDF-extract(“”,gxy)
G RX=G Xltk R
PRK 3e2m=HKDF-extract(PRK 2e,G RX)
K 2m=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 2)
MAC 2=AEAD(K 2m;〈ID CRED R,TH 2,CRED R,AD 2〉;“”)
K 2e=HKDF-expand(PRK 2e,TH 2)
m2: C I, G Y, C R,
cipher 2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
K 2e XOR 〈ID CRED R,MAC 2,AD 2〉
PRK 2e=HKDF-extract(“”,gxy)
G RX=CRED Rx
PRK 4x3m=PRK 3e2m=HKDF-extract(PRK 2e,G RX)
K 3ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 2)
TH 3=H(TH 2,cipher 2,C R)
K 3m=HKDF-expand(PRK 4x3m,TH 3)
MAC 3=AEAD(K 3m;〈ID CRED I,TH 3,CRED I,AD 3〉;“”)
Sig 3= sign(ltk I;〈ID CRED I,TH 3,CRED I,AD 3〉,MAC 3〉)
m3 :C R,AEAD(K 3ae;TH 3;〈ID CRED I,Sig 3,AD 3〉)
TH 3=H(TH 2,cipher 2,C R)
K 3m=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 3)
K 3ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 3)
Fig. 3. The SIG-STAT method of EDHOC. CRED Iand ltk I, and CRED Rand ltk Rare two
public-private key pairs. CRED Iand ltk Imust be signature keys in the SIGmethod. sign(x;y)
is used to denote the signing of message y using key x.
12 K. Norrman et al.
STAT-STAT In this method, both the initiator and the responder run the STAT
method. The responder’smessage looks exactly the same as in the previous subsec-
tion, for SIG-STAT. The initiator’s message, however, need not be signed anymore,
since the initiator too is running the STAT method. Thus, we skip the signature
process in the steps described above, and instead of creating and passing Sig 3 to
the AEAD encryption algorithm, the initiator passes MAC 3 itself.
As concerns the intermediate keys, PRK 2e and PRK 3e2m are generated ex-
actly as in the SIG-STAT method. However, now, since the initiator also runs a STAT
method, PRK 4x3m is not equal to PRK 3e2m as earlier, but computed by passing to
the KDF the following parameters – as salt, PRK 3e2m and as IKM, G IY. G IY is
obtained by exponentiating G Y (received from the responder in the second mes-
sage) to the initiator’s private authentication key. The encryption and decryption
keys are computed based on these values of the intermediate key. All messages are
constructed using these values of the intermediate keys and keys.
STAT-SIG Here, the responder runs the SIG method, while the initiator runs the
STAT method. Thus, the second message, sent by the responder to the initiator
needs an extra layer of signing.
The intermediate keys are now generated in a slightly different manner, since
the responder is running SIG. PRK 2e is still generated by running the KDF on
the empty salt and G XY. However, PRK 3e2m is now equal to PRK 2e. K 2m and K 2e
follow the same guidelines as earlier, but with these values of PRK 2e and PRK 3e2m.
The responder constructs MAC 2 as earlier.
Once MAC 2 has been constructed, the responder runs the signature algorithm
with a COSE object. This object has ID CRED R as protected data, a concatenation
of TH 2, CRED R, and AD 2 as external data, and the payload MAC 2. This is signed
using the responder’s private authentication key to obtain Sig 2.
The outer encryption object is constructed by considering a plaintext consist-
ing of CRED R, Sig 2 (instead of MAC 2), and AD 2. The key K 2ae is XOR-ed with this
plaintext to get a ciphertext, and the responder sends G Y, C R, and this ciphertext
to the initiator as the second message.
The initiator generates the intermediate key PRK 2eby running the KDF on
empty salt and G XY and sets PRK 3e2m equal to PRK 2e. These are used for gener-
ating the K 2m and K 2e for decrypting the message received from the responder.
The intermediate key PRK 4x3m is generated by giving as input to HKDF-extract
PRK 3e2m as salt, and G IY as IKM – G IY is obtained as in the STAT-STAT method.
Now, to generate the encryption keys, the initiator generates K 3m by passing
PRK 4x3m and TH 3 to the KDF. K 3ae is generated by running the KDF on PRK 3e2m
and TH 3. There is no signature, and the message is constructed exactly as in the
STAT-STAT case, except with these values of K 3m and K 3ae.
In order to decrypt the message received from the initiator, the responder
needs to generate keys. K 3ae is straightforward, but in order to generate K 3m, the
responder needs PRK 4x3m. To generate this intermediate key, the responder runs
HKDF-extract on PRK 3e2m as salt, and uses as IKM G IY, which is obtained by ex-
ponentiating the initiator’s public authentication key to the responder’s ephemeral
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secretG Y. As earlier, this is an asymmetric key used for “decrypting” the G IY used
by the initiator to construct its PRK 4x3m. This method is illustrated in Figure 4.
Initiator
Knows g, CRED I, ltk I, ID CRED I,
ID CRED R,AD 1, AD 3
Responder
Knows g, CRED R, ltk R, ID CRED R,
ID CRED I,AD 2
Generates Method, Suites I, C I, x
G X=gx
m1: Method, Suites I, G X, C I, AD 1
Generates C R, y
G Y=gy
TH 2=H(m1,〈C I,G Y,C R〉)
PRK 3e2m=PRK 2e=HKDF-extract(“”,gxy)
K 2m=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 2)
MAC 2=AEAD(K 2m;〈ID CRED R,TH 2,CRED R,AD 2〉;“”)
Sig 2= sign(ltk R;〈〈ID CRED R,TH 2,CRED R,AD 2〉,MAC 2〉)
K 2e=HKDF-expand(PRK 2e,TH 2)
m2: C I, G Y, C R,
cipher 2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
K 2e XOR 〈ID CRED R,Sig 2,AD 2〉
PRK 3e2m=PRK 2e=HKDF-extract(“”,gxy)
G IY=G Yltk I
PRK 4x3m=HKDF-extract(PRK 3e2m,G IY)
TH 3=H(TH 2,cipher 2,C R)
K 3m=HKDF-expand(PRK 4x3m,TH 3)
MAC 3=AEAD(K 3m;〈ID CRED I,TH 3,CRED I,AD 3〉;“”)
K 3ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 3)
m3 :C R,AEAD(K 3ae;TH 3;〈ID CRED I,MAC 3,AD 3〉)
G IY=CRED Iy
PRK 4x3m=HKDF-extract(PRK 3e2m,G IY)
TH 3=H(TH 2,cipher 2,C R)
K 3m=HKDF-expand(PRK 4x3m,TH 3)
K 3ae=HKDF-expand(PRK 3e2m,TH 3)
Fig. 4. The STAT-SIG method of EDHOC
2.6 SIG-SIG method
In this method, both parties run the SIG method, and therefore, both the second
and third messages need to be signed before being encrypted via AEAD. The in-
termediate key PRK 2e is generated as usual, by sending the empty salt and the
shared secret to the KDF, and both PRK 3e2m and PRK 4x3m are set equal to PRK 2e.
The second message looks like the one from the SIG-STAT method described above,
while the third looks like the one from the STAT-SIG method.
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2.7 Negotiating a cipher suite andmethod and correlation parameters
Recall that we mentioned that the first message contains a list of cipher suites,
ranked according to the preference of the initiator. What does a cipher suite ac-
tually contain? An EDHOC cipher suite consists of an ordered set of COSE algo-
rithms: an AEAD algorithm, a hash algorithm, an ECDH curve, a signature algo-
rithm, a signature algorithm curve, an applicationAEAD algorithm, and an appli-
cation hash algorithm from the COSE Algorithms and Elliptic Curves registries.
There are four supported cipher suites in EDHOC – we refer the reader to Sec-
tion 3.4 of [25] for the specifics of the algorithms allowed therein. Each cipher suite
is identified by one of four predefined integer labels (0–3). Some algorithms are
not used in some methods. The signature algorithm and the signature algorithm
curve are not used in methods without signature authentication (i.e. in PSK-PSK
and STAT-STAT).
In order to keep the presentation clean, we have omitted the cipher suite negoti-
ation process from the description of the methods. However, this process happens
as follows, at the beginning of every method, once the responder receives the
first message. The initiator proposes an ordered list of cipher suites they support.
This list presented in descending order to the responder who either accepts the
topmost entry in this list (if they also support that suite) or makes a counter-
proposal, namely the topmost entry which they support from the remaining part
of the list. If there is no such entry the responder can reject, and the protocol
does not continue. Similarly, the responder can reject the initiator’s choices for
the method and correlation parameters as well – in the case of a reject for either
of these values, the protocol aborts.
2.8 Deriving an OSCORE context
EDHOC is often used to set up parameters for OSCORE. In this case, the parties
make sure that the connection identifiers are distinct, i.e. CRED I 6=CRED R, since
these are used as OSCORE sender IDs. If the initiator plays the role of the CoAP
client, and the responder the role of the CoAP server, the client gets the sender
ID CRED R and the server the ID CRED I (the identifiers are swapped). The AEAD
and hash algorithms for OSCORE stay the same as those used for the selected
cipher suite in EDHOC, while the master secret for OSCORE is derived using the
key length of the AEAD algorithm of EDHOC.
2.9 Expected security properties
In this section, we list all the claimsmade by the authors of [25] regarding the secu-
rity properties satisfied by EDHOC. We will revisit these claims when we discuss
the formal modeling and verification of EDHOC in Section 3.
The following are the claims made by the authors of [25].
EDHOC inherits some security properties from the SIGMA protocol. These
are perfect forward secrecy, mutual authentication with aliveness, consistency,
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peer awareness (to the responder, but not to the initiator), identity protection,
and Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resistance.
Allmethods other than PSK-PSK offer identity protection of the initiator against
active attacks and that of the responder against passive attacks. The roles should
be assigned to protect the more sensitive identity. This is usually the entity whose
identity cannot be inferred from information in the lower layers.
EDHOC also provides protection against replay attacks by the attacker. The
attacker also cannot affect any negotiated parameters. A single session of EDHOC
enables the responder to verify that the selected cipher suite is the most preferred
of the initiator which is supported by both parties, even though there is no nego-
tiation of cipher suites per se.
In order to reduce the chances of pervasive monitoring, EDHOC only supports
methods with perfect forward secrecy. One way to limit the effect of breaches is
to minimize the use of symmetrical group keys for bootstrapping. EDHOC, there-
fore, uses raw public keys and self-signed certificates instead of symmetrical group
keys for bootstrapping.
For the PSK-PSK method, compromising PSK lets the attacker impersonate ei-
ther party in EDHOC exchanges with the other. For the other methods, compro-
mising the private authentication keys of one party lets the attacker impersonate
only the compromised party in exchanges with other parties. In particular, it does
not let the attacker masquerade as any other parties in communications with the
compromised party.
Compromise of the HKDF input parameters (G XY shared secret and/or PSK)
leads to all session keys derived from that shared secret being deemed compro-
mised. However, the compromise of one session key does not affect other session
keys. If the long-term keys (PSK or private authentication keys) are compromised,
this does not affect the security of instances of EDHOC which have completed
prior to compromise.
In this paper, we verify secrecy, authentication, session independence, per-
fect forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation, and some flavor of post-
compromise security. We will also discuss, in Section 4 what it means for these
properties to hold about this model.
3 Formalization and results
Next we describe our approach towards formalizing the EDHOC protocol. We use
the symbolic (Dolev-Yao) model for verification, with Tamarin for tool support.
The next three subsections describe our threat model, briefly present the Tamarin
tool, and our modeling choices. Finally, we present the properties that we proved
in this effort.
3.1 Threat model
We verify EDHOC in the symbolic Dolev-Yao model: as customary in this style of
modeling, we assume all cryptographic primitives to be “perfect”, and hence only
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allow the attacker to encrypt and decrypt messages when they know the key, and
exclude hash collisions, for example; the attacker is in control of the communica-
tion channel, and can interact with unbounded sessions of the protocol, dropping,
injecting and modifying messages at their liking.
One important point of the modeling is that we allow the attacker to imper-
sonate dishonest and/or compromised endpoints, by revealing their long-term and
session key material at any given point. Conversely, we say that a party is honest
if they never reveal their long-term key or session key material.
Another important point is to define what the key material is. EDHOC does
not result in an explicit session key, but a cryptographic state from which keys for
OSCORE can be derived using HKDF. As will be seen below, depending on how
the key material is defined, the different methods will have different authentica-
tion properties. In particular, all methods except those where the initiator uses
the STAT method provide a stronger form of authentication (injective agreement)
for the initator.
3.2 Desired Properties
Next we list the properties that will be considered during verification.
Secrecy We say that EDHOC satisfies secrecy of the established session key sk
between two honest parties A and B if, for any run of the protocol A and B, the
attacker does not get to know sk. The attacker may passively observe—and ac-
tively interfere with—the communication, and run any number of sessions with A
and B, in either role, concurrently or otherwise.
Authentication To define EDHOC’s authentication properties we make use of
Lowe’s definition of injective agreement [14]:
“We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiatorA [injective] agreement
with a responder B on a set of data items ds if, whenever A (acting as
initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder B,
then B has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and
B was acting as responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the
data values corresponding to all the variables in ds, and each such run of
A corresponds to a unique run of B.”
We say that EDHOC in methodm satisfies explicit authentication for the initiator
A with a responder B, if injective agreement holds for A with B on the session
key sk, when running method m. The corresponding definition for the responder
is analogous. If both parties obtain explicit authentication we refer to it as mutual
explicit authentication or simply explicit authentication when it is clear from the
context.
A party obtains the explicit authentication guarantee when both parties agree
on the session key (and other parameters), when the party completes the pro-
tocol run. It turned out, however, that explicit authentication does not hold for
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all EDHOC methods, in which cases we prove implicit authentication as defined
in [7]. In a nutshell, a protocol satisfies implicit authentication if the initiator and
responder agree on the session key only after a successful execution of the protocol.
That is, authentication happens only implicitly, as there is no confirmation to the
initiator that the responder has computed the same session key.More precisely, we
adapt the definition of [7] to the symbolic model, and we prove that if an initiator
A and a responder B complete the protocol deriving the same session key, then A
believes she is talking to B and B believes he is talking to A.
Session independence A protocol satisfies session independence if knowing a
session key does not give the attacker any information about other sessions. To
model session key independence of EDHOC, we allow leakage of session keys, and
additionally check security only of those sessions for which the session keys have
not been directly revealed to the attacker.
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) A protocol satisfies perfect forward secrecy if,
for any run of the protocol in which the initiator and the responder agree on a
session key sk, the attacker does not learn sk, even when the long-term keys are
revealed after the session is completed.
Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) This property takes the perspective
of one of the endpoints of the protocol, say Alice running a session with Bob. A
protocol is secure under KCI if Alice can still establish a secure session with Bob,
even though Alice’s keys are compromised at any time, and Bob’s key material is
not leaked until the end of the session.
Post-compromise security (PCS) A protocol that has post-compromise secu-
rity (following definitions in [5]) is capable of establishing a secure session even
after one of the parties has been compromised. Cohn-Cordon et al. [5] presents
two notions of PCS, namely weak and strong PCS: here we focus on the latter.
A protocol guarantees weak PCS if secrecy of any session key sk holds between
the initiator and the responder, even if the run of the protocol that established sk
happens after a limited compromise, where the key material is not leaked, but the
attacker is capable of impersonating both parties (i.e. has the ability to perform
all cryptographic operations using the initiator’s and responder’s long term keys,
but has not access to the long term keys).
Note We plan to show weak PCS and KCI in a future version of the model, hence
we mention it here. However at the moment verifying this property runs out of
memory, so we will not present results relating to weak PCS in the current version
of the report. It will be included in future versions however.
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3.3 Tamarin
We chose Tamarin to model and verify EDHOC in the Symbolic model. Tamarin
is an interactive verification tool based on multi-set rewriting rules with event an-
notations, which allows the user to check Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas
on these models. Multi-set rewrite rules with events take the form:
l−[e]→r
where l and r are multi-sets of facts, and e is a multi-set of events. Facts are n-ary
predicates over a term algebra, which defines a set of function symbols F , vari-
ables V and namesN . Tamarin checks equality of these terms under an equational
theory E. For example, one can write
dec(enc(x,y),y)=E x
to denote that symmetric decryption reverses the encryption operation under this
theory. All operations on terms are defined under E, hence we omit the subscript
from now on as the equational theory is fixed per model.
Semantics and built-ins Tamarin states S, S′ are multisets of facts, and a se-
mantic transition S=[E]⇒S′ occurs if there is a rule l−[e]→ r and a substitution
σ such that S⊇σ(l) and S′=S\σ(l)⊎σ(r) and E=σ(e).
There are a few more details, such as persistent facts that are denoted by a !
and are never removed from the state. The sorts fresh (denoted by ∼) and public
(denoted by $) denote fresh constants and public values known to the attacker re-
spectively, and are both sub-sorts of a base sort. Finally, Tamarin has some built-in
predicates (In,Out to represent input and output of messages with the attacker,
and Fr to denote a fresh constant created in the current rule, among others), rules
and equations that represent the attacker’s knowledge and standard equational
theories in the symbolic model, which we present later.
Notational conventions In the remainder of this section we present Tamarin
code as it appears in the models that we verify, in the style of literate program-
ming. Whenever possible we match the style of the protocol diagrams in Section 2
and the naming convention of the EDHOC specification [25], so that each element
of the model is traceable to the standard. There are a few exceptions to this, most
notably some variable names that we introduce for the sake of the Tamarin model
and are not present in the original specification, which will appear in camelCase,
and the syntax for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation which is specific to Tamarin.
We also use xx to name the ephemeral key for the initiator (resp. yy for the
responder) as to avoid confusion with Tamarin’s builtin variable names x and y.
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Protocol rules and equations Tamarin allows users to define new function
symbols and equational theories. These user defined objects are then translated
byTamarin into rewrite rules, which are added to the set of considered rules during
verification. For example, in our model we have a symbol to denote authenticated
encryption and hence Tamarin produces the rule:
1 [ !KU(k ) , !KU(m) , !KU(ad ) , !KU( a l ) ] −[]→ [ !KU(AEAD(k , m, ad , a l ) ) ]
to denote that if the attacker knows a key k, a message m, the authenticated data
ad, and an algorithm al, then they can construct the encryption using these pa-
rameters, hence get to know the message AEAD(k, m, ad, al).
In ourmodel we introduce a theory for authenticated encryption, andmake use
of the built-in theories of exclusive-or and Diffie-Hellman operations. Authenti-
cated encryption, which is encryption with authentication data as detailed in [20],
has the following two equations:
1 AEAD-decrypt(k , AEAD(k , m, ad , a l ) , ad , a l ) = m
2 decrypt(k , AEAD(k , m, ad , a l ) , a l ) = m
With the first rule we allow the protocol to decrypt the message m if the encryp-
tion has matching key k, authenticated data ad, and uses the same algorithm al.
The second rule allows the attacker to decrypt the message m with the key k and
without the authenticated data ad, and hence skip the check.
The built-in theories for XOR and Diffie-Hellman are a fair bit more complex
than authenticated encryption, hence we refer to the original papers [8,23] for a
full reference. Suffices to say that the XOR theory introduces the symbol ⊕, for
expressing XOR operations x ⊕ y, plus the necessary equational theory including
associativity, commutativity, and inverse. The theory for Diffie-Hellman intro-
duces exponentiation gˆy and product of exponents x ∗ y as a built-in symbols in
the language, plus the necessary equational theory of associativity, commutativity,
distributivity of exponentiation with product, and inverse.
Syntactic sugar In the following presentationweuse some syntactic sugar,which
is necessary to understand to look at the concrete rules. First is the use of let bind-
ings ( let ... in), which are series of definitions of patterns which are substituted in
the rest of the rule. Another prominent feature is the use of tuples (〈t1 , ..., tn〉)
which are a built-in concept in Tamarin.
3.4 Modeling EDHOC
In this section we detail the modeling choices that we have made for this formal
verification effort.
Wemodel the five differentmethods of EDHOC from a single specification that
derives all valid combinations: PSK-PSK, SIG-SIG, SIG-STAT, STAT-SIG and STAT-STAT.
We use the M4 macro language to derive these different methods from a single
description of the protocol, thus enforcing uniformity in the presentation. Other
parameters to the model include the optional data of the EDHOC specification,
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that is, the connection identifiersC I and C R, and the authenticated data AD 1, AD 2
and AD 3. To keep the presentation brief, we only present two variants, where one
party uses a signature key and the other a static DH key (SIG-STAT and STAT-SIG).
However the full code can be inspected at the github repository [18].
1 r u l e reg is terLTK SIG :
2 [ Fr( ˜ l t k ) ] −[UniqLTK($A, ˜ l t k )]→
3 [ ! LTK SIG($A, ˜ l t k ) , ! PK SIG($A, pk( ˜ l t k ) ) , Out(〈 ! 〈$A, pk( ˜ l t k ) 〉 ! 〉 ) ]
4 r u l e registerLTK STAT :
5 [ Fr( ˜ l t k ) ] −[UniqLTK($A, ’g ’ ˆ ˜ l t k )]→
6 [ ! LTK STAT($A, ˜ l t k ) , ! PK STAT($A, ’ g ’ ˆ ˜ l t k ) , Out(〈 ! 〈$A, ’ g ’ ˆ ˜ l t k 〉 ! 〉 ) ]
7 r u l e registerLTK PSK :
8 [ Fr( ˜ l t k ) ] −[UniqLTK(〈$A, $B〉 , ˜ l t k )]→ [ ! LTK PSK(〈$A, $B〉 , ˜ l t k ) ]
These three rules express the registering of the long term keys for the SIG, STAT
and PSK methods respectively. registerLTK PSK registers a symmetric key for each
pair of agents A and B, while the other two rules register a public key (for signing
and encrypting, respectively) that are tied to the identity of an agent A. The event
UniqLTK marks that the long term key is unique for each agent or pair of agents, as
enforced by the following restriction:
1 r e s t r i c t i o n uniqLTKs :
2 ” ∀ i d k1 k2 # i # j . (UniqLTK( id , k1 )@i ∧ UniqLTK( id , k2 )@j ) ⇒ k1 = k2 ”
This models that there is an external mechanism ensuring that the long term keys
are bound to the correct identity, e.g., a certificate authority, and that the attacker
cannot register new public keys for an existing identity.
OPTLS Long term keys are revealed to the attacker through specific rules with
the event LTKRev.
1 r u l e revealLTK SIG :
2 [ ! LTK SIG($A, ˜ l t k ) ] −[LTKRev($A)]→ [Out( ˜ l t k ) ]
3 r u l e revealLTK STAT :
4 [ ! LTK STAT($A, ˜ l t k ) ] −[LTKRev($A)]→ [Out( ˜ l t k ) ]
5 r u l e revealLTK PSK :
6 [ ! LTK PSK(〈$A, $B〉 , ˜ l t k ) ] −[LTKRev(〈$A, $B〉 )]→ [Out( ˜ l t k ) ]
These rules are used to check the different lemmas for authentication and key
secrecy, as we limit when the attacker is able to reveal the keys to prove forward
secrecy, as discussed in Section 3.1. Each of the session keys is also revealed with
similar rules, depending on the method to check session independence.
PSK-PSK The following rules model the symmetric key based PSK-PSK method and
are derived from the M4 file, as presented in Section 2.
First we present the rule I1 PSK PSK, which corresponds to the Initiator starting
a session:
1 r u l e I1 PSK PSK :
2 l e t gx = ’ g ’ ˆ ˜ xx
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3 ID PSK = 〈$U, $V〉
4 m1 = 〈 ’PSK’ , ’PSK’ , $cSUITE0 , gx , ID PSK〉
5 i n
6 [ ! LTK PSK(〈$U, $V〉 , ˜ l t k ) , Fr( ˜ xx ) , Fr( ˜ t i d ) ]
7 −[ I1 ( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, m1) ]→
8 [ StI1 PSK PSK($U, ˜ l t k , $V, ˜ xx , m1, ˜ t i d ) , Out(m1) ]
This rule uses the persistent predicate !LTK PSK to retrieve the long-term sym-
metric key for the two parties U (the initiator) and V (the responder). The two
predicates Fr(˜xx) and Fr(˜ tid ) denote the creation of a fresh ephemeral key and a
fresh session identifier. Message 1 is then constructed as a tuple in the let binder
following the specification.
It is worth noting that there are some differences in the way m1 is constructed
when compared to the specification. In particular, themethod field is divided into
two fields representing the method for the initiator and the responder, the connec-
tion identifier is omitted and the ciphersuite is represented by the public variable
$cSUITES0 (known to the attacker). We plan to introduce the connection identifier
C Iin our ongoing verification effort, whereas the other two are modeling choices
that do not affect the behaviour of the model.
Finally, we use the fact StI1 PSK PSK($U, ˜ltk, $V, ˜xx, m1, ˜ tid ) to save the internal
state for the remainder of the initiator’s protocol.
The next rule models the responder receiving m1 from the initiator, construct-
ing the Diffie-Hellman shared secret gxy and preparing m 2.
1 r u l e R2 PSK PSK :
2 l e t
3 data 2 = 〈 ’ g ’ ˆ ˜ yy〉
4 ID PSK = 〈$U, $V〉
5 m1 = 〈 ’PSK’ , ’PSK’ , $cSUITE0 , gx , ID PSK〉
6 TH 2 = H(〈$cHash0 , m1, data 2 〉 )
7 prk 2e = HKDF-extract( ˜ l t k , gx ˆ ˜ yy )
8 prk 3e2m = prk 2e
9 extAad2 = TH 2
10 p la inT ex t 2 = ’ emptyStr ’
11 K 2ae = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2ae ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
12 CIPHERTEXT 2 = AEAD( pla inText2 , K 2ae , extAad2 , $cAEAD0 )
13 m2 = 〈data 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2〉
14 i n
15 [ ! LTK PSK(〈$U, $V〉 , ˜ l t k ) , In (m1) , Fr( ˜ yy ) , Fr( ˜ t i d ) ]
16 −[ ExpRunningR( ˜ t i d , $V, exp sk )
17 , R2( ˜ t i d , $V, m1, m2) ]→
18 [ StR2 PSK PSK($U, $V, ˜ l t k
, ˜ yy , prk 3e2m , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , gx ˆ ˜ yy , ˜ t i d , m1, m2) , Out(m2) ]
Here we obtain as input message 1 (m1), create a fresh exponent yy and ses-
sion identifier tid . The let bindings in this rule show how to construct message m2.
They can be easily mapped to the diagram in Figure 2.We use the public constant
’emptyStr’ instead of an empty string since Tamarin has no concept of strings (single
quotes denote constants).
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Here we notice the introduction of the event ExpRunningR(˜tid, $V, exp sk) which
we later use to show explicit authentication (hence the Exp prefix) by finding an
injective correspondence between two events.
The next rule models the initiator receiving m2 and responding with the final
message m3:
1 r u l e I3 PSK PSK :
2 l e t
3 data 2 = 〈gy〉
4 TH 2 = H(〈$cHash0 , m1, data 2 〉 )
5 prk 2e = HKDF-extract( ˜ l t k , gy ˆ ˜ xx )
6 prk 3e2m = prk 2e
7 p la inT ex t 2 = ’ emptyStr ’
8 extAad2 = TH 2
9 K 2ae = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2ae ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
10 CIPHERTEXT 2 = AEAD( pla inText2 , K 2ae , extAad2 , $cAEAD0 )
11 m2 = 〈data 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2〉
12 data 3 = ’ emptyStr ’
13 TH 3 = H(〈$cHash0 , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , data 3〉 )
14 K 3ae = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 3ae ’ 〉 , prk 3e2m )
15 extAad3 = TH 3
16 p la inT ex t 3 = ’ emptyStr ’
17 CIPHERTEXT 3 = AEAD( pla inText3 , K 3ae , extAad3 , $cAEAD0 )
18 m3 = 〈data 3 , CIPHERTEXT 3〉
19 exp sk = 〈gy ˆ ˜ xx〉
20 imp sk = exp sk
21 i n
22 [ StI1 PSK PSK($U, ˜ l t k , $V, ˜ xx , m1, ˜ t i d ) , In (m2) ]
23 −[ ExpCommitI( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, exp sk )
24 , CommitI( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, imp sk )
25 , I3 ( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, m1, m2, m3) ]→
26 [ Out(m3) ]
Apart from observations similar to those already made for the previous mes-
sages, we should mention here the two events ExpCommitI(˜tid, $U, $V, exp sk) and
CommitI(˜tid, $U, $V, imp sk). These eventsmark the completion of the protocol for the
initiator, and will be used later for verifying explicit and implicit authentication,
respectively. The difference is the choice of keymaterial onwhich we check authen-
tication (exp sk vs imp sk). In the case of the SIG method, as above, these keys are the
same, but there will be a crucial difference when the initiator runs the STATmethod.
Finally, we have the last rule for the responder:
1 r u l e R4 PSK PSK :
2 l e t
3 data 3 = ’ emptyStr ’
4 TH 3 = H(〈$cHash0 , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , data 3〉 )
5 K 3ae = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 3 , ’ K 3ae ’ 〉 , prk 3e2m )
6 extAad3 = TH 3
7 p la inT ex t 3 = ’ emptyStr ’
8 CIPHERTEXT 3 = AEAD( pla inText3 , K 3ae , extAad3 , $cAEAD0 )
Formal Analysis of EDHOC Key Establishment for Constrained IoT Devices 23
9 m3 = 〈data 3 , CIPHERTEXT 3〉
10 exp sk = 〈gxy〉
11 imp sk = exp sk
12 i n
13 [ StR2 PSK PSK($U,
$V, ˜ l t k , ˜ yy , prk 3e2m , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , gxy , ˜ t i d , m1, m2) , In (m3) ]
14 −[ ExpCommitR( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, exp sk )
15 , CommitR( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, imp sk )
16 , R4( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, m1, m2, m3) ]→
17 [ ]
This rule receives message 3, checks that the Diffie-Hellman key G XY corre-
sponds to the local state, and then terminates the protocol. As in the previous
message, we mark acceptance of the third message from the responder with the
two commit events, and conclude.
STAT-SIG Next we present the mixed asymmetric method STAT-SIG. We chose
STAT-SIG for this presentation of the asymmetric methods as this configuration
shows all interesting features at once: mixed authentication methods, and implicit
authentication on the responder.
1 r u l e I1 STAT SIG :
2 l e t gx = ’ g ’ ˆ ˜ xx
3 m1 = 〈 ’STAT ’ , ’ SIG ’ , $cSUITE0 , gx〉
4 i n
5 [ ! LTK STAT($U, ˜ l t k ) , Fr( ˜ xx ) , Fr( ˜ t i d ) ]
6 −[ I1 ( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, m1) ]→
7 [ StI1 STAT SIG($U, ˜ l t k , $V, ˜ xx , m1, ˜ t i d ) , Out(m1) ]
Like in the previous model, this rule starts the initiator and outputs the first
messagem1, this time looking up the public key forU andusing theSTAT-SIGmethod.
Next we look at the rule for the responder:
1 r u l e R2 STAT SIG :
2 l e t
3 data 2 = 〈 ’ g ’ ˆ ˜ yy〉
4 m1 = 〈 ’STAT ’ , ’SIG ’ , $cSUITE0 , gx〉
5 TH 2 = H(〈$cHash0 , m1, data 2 〉 )
6 prk 2e = HKDF-extract( ’ emptyStr ’ , gx ˆ ˜ yy )
7 prk 3e2m = prk 2e
8 K 2m = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’K 2m ’ 〉 , prk 3e2m )
9 protec ted2 = $V / / ID CRED V
10 CRED V = pkV
11 extAad2 = 〈TH 2 , CRED V〉
12 assocData2 = 〈protected2 , extAad2〉
13 MAC 2 = AEAD( ’ emptyStr ’ , K 2m , assocData2 , $cAEAD0 )
14 authV = s ign (〈assocData2 , MAC 2〉 , ˜ l t k )
15 p la inT ex t 2 = 〈$V, authV〉
16 K 2e = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2e ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
17 K 2e 1 = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2e ’ , ’ 1 ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
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18 K 2e 2 = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2e ’ , ’ 2 ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
19 CIPHERTEXT 2 = 〈$V ⊕ K 2e 1 , authV ⊕ K 2e 2〉
20 m2 = 〈data 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2〉
21 exp sk = 〈gx ˆ ˜ yy〉
22 i n
23 [ ! LTK SIG($V, ˜ l t k ) , ! PK SIG($V, pkV ) , In (m1) , Fr( ˜ yy ) , Fr( ˜ t i d ) ]
24 −[ ExpRunningR( ˜ t i d , $V, exp sk ) , R2( ˜ t i d , $V, m1, m2) ]→
25 [ StR2 STAT SIG
($V, ˜ l t k , ˜ yy , prk 3e2m , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , gx ˆ ˜ yy , ˜ t i d , m1, m2)
26 , Out(m2) ]
Here is a place where the model and the original specification differ slightly, the
reason being that we must allow some behaviour that is otherwise not covered by
the symbolic handling of XOR encryption. It must be possible for the attacker to
break apart the fields of CIPHERTEXT 2, and obtain part of the key K 2e if they know
part of the plaintext, or viceversa. Hence CIPHERTEXT 2 is not a direct XOR “en-
cryption”, but rather a tuple where each field is XORed with a half-key expansion
(K 2e 1 and K 2e 2). Notice also the lack of exp sk, as the semi-static Diffie-Hellman
key giy cannot be computed by the responder at this stage.
Next we have the second rule for the initiator:
1 r u l e I3 STAT SIG :
2 l e t
3 data 2 = 〈gy〉
4 TH 2 = H(〈$cHash0 , m1, data 2 〉 )
5 prk 2e = HKDF-extract( ’ emptyStr ’ , gy ˆ ˜ xx )
6 p la inT ex t 2 = 〈$V, authR〉
7 CRED V = pkV
8 prk 3e2m = prk 2e
9 K 2e 1 = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2e ’ , ’ 1 ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
10 K 2e 2 = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 2e ’ , ’ 2 ’ 〉 , prk 2e )
11 CIPHERTEXT 2 = 〈$V ⊕ K 2e 1 , authR ⊕ K 2e 2〉
12 m2 = 〈data 2 , CIPH3RTEXT 2〉
13 K 2m = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’K 2m ’ 〉 , prk 3e2m )
14 protec ted2 = $V / / ID CRED V
15 extAad2 = 〈TH 2 , CRED V〉
16 assocData2 = 〈protected2 , extAad2〉
17 MAC 2 = AEAD( ’ emptyStr ’ , K 2m , assocData2 , $cAEAD0 )
18 data 3 = ’ emptyStr ’
19 TH 3 = H(〈$cHash0 , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , data 3〉 )
20 K 3ae = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 3ae ’ 〉 , prk 3e2m )
21 g iy = gy ˆ ˜ l t k
22 prk 4x3m = HKDF-extract(prk 3e2m , g iy )
23 K 3m = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 3 , ’K 3m ’ 〉 , prk 4x3m )
24 protec ted3 = $U / / ID CRED U
25 CRED U = pkU
26 extAad3 = 〈TH 3 , CRED U〉
27 assocData3 = 〈protected3 , extAad3〉
28 MAC 3 = AEAD( ’ emptyStr ’ , K 3m , assocData3 , $cAEAD0 )
29 authU = MAC 3
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30 p la inT ex t 3 = 〈$U, authU〉
31 extAad3Outer = TH 3
32 CIPHERTEXT 3 = AEAD( pla inText3 , K 3ae , extAad3Outer , $cAEAD0 )
33 m3 = 〈data 3 , CIPHERTEXT 3〉
34 exp sk = 〈gy ˆ ˜ xx〉
35 imp sk = 〈exp sk , g i y 〉
36 i n
37 [ StI1 STAT SIG($U, ˜ l t k , $V, ˜ xx , m1, ˜ t i d )
38 , ! PK SIG($V, pkV )
39 , ! PK STAT($U, pkU )
40 , In (m2) ]
41 −[ ExpCommitI( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, exp sk ) , CommitI( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, imp sk )
42 , I3 ( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, m1, m2, m3)
43 , Eq( v e r i f y (authR , 〈assocData2 , MAC 2〉 , CRED V) , t r ue ) ]→
44 [ Out(m3) ]
Here is a crucial difference that follows from our last observation: we notice the
addition of the semi-static Diffie-Hellman key to the term imp sk. This will be used
later to check implicit authentication, as is reflected by the commit events.
1 r u l e R4 STAT SIG :
2 l e t
3 data 3 = ’ emptyStr ’
4 TH 3 = H(〈cHash0 , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , data 3 〉 )
5 K 3ae = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 2 , ’ K 3ae ’ 〉 , prk 3e2m )
6 CRED U = pkU
7 extAad3 = TH 3
8 p la inT ex t 3 = 〈$U, au t h I 〉
9 CIPHERTEXT 3 = AEAD( pla inText3 , K 3ae , extAad3Outer , $cAEAD0 )
10 g iy = CRED U ˆ ˜ yy
11 prk 4x3m = HKDF-extract(prk 3e2m , g iy )
12 K 3m = HKDF-expand(〈$cAEAD0, TH 3 , ’K 3m ’ 〉 , prk 4x3m )
13 protec ted3 = $U / / ID CRED U
14 extAad3 = 〈TH 3 , CRED U〉
15 assocData3 = 〈protected3 , extAad3〉
16 MAC 3 = AEAD( ’ emptyStr ’ , K 3m , assocData3 , $cAEAD0 )
17 m3 = 〈data 3 , CIPHERTEXT 3〉
18 exp sk = 〈gxy〉
19 imp sk = 〈exp sk , g i y 〉
20 i n
21 [ StR2 STAT SIG
($V, ˜ l t k , ˜ yy , prk 3e2m , TH 2 , CIPHERTEXT 2 , gxy , ˜ t i d , m1, m2)
22 , ! PK STAT($U, pkU )
23 , ! PK SIG($V, pkV )
24 , In (m3) ]
25 −[ ExpCommitR( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, exp sk )
26 , CommitR( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, imp sk )
27 , R4( ˜ t i d , $U, $V, m1, m2, m3)
28 , Eq( authI , MAC 3) ]→
29 [ ]
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On the same rule we can also see how implicit authentication differs from
explicit authentication for the Initiator running the static method: on imp sk the
semi-static keyG IY is present, whereas exp sk does not include it for injective agree-
ment. The reason for this is that, when sending message 2, the responder does not
yet know the identity of the initiator, hence an active attacker can interfere with
the protocol in such a way that the two parties do not agree on the semi-static
key G IY until after the end of the protocol, when the responder starts using the
derived key material with the initiator. This is outside the scope of the EDHOC
protocol, hence we have left this part out of the modeling and only focus on the
key material that both parties agree on. In future work, it will be interesting to
see the interaction of EDHOC with OSCORE which can use EDHOC’s keys.
Looking at authV in rule R2 STAT SIG we can see how the signature message
is constructed: it is a signature of the transcript including message 2, using the
Responder’s long term public key. Here lies one of the two main differences be-
tween the STAT and SIG methods in the model, the other being the corresponding
authentication check. A simple matching of the MAC tag on the initiator side
suffices. This saving comes from the use of challenge-response signatures. (Eq(
authI, MAC 3)), instead of verifying the public key signature on the responder side
(Eq(verify(authR, 〈assocData2, MAC 2〉, CRED V), true)).
The event Eq has no special meaning in Tamarin, but we use it to check that
the two arguments are equal by introducing the following restriction:
1 r e s t r i c t i o n Eq : ” ∀ x y # i . Eq(x , y )@i⇒ x = y ”
3.5 Properties
In this section we present the properties that we have shown for EDHOC, and
show the lemmas that verify them. We refer to Section 3.2 for a full explanation of
the properties that we check. Here we focus on their formalization into Tamarin
lemmas.
Explicit authentication Wemodel explicit authenticationbetween the initiator
and the responder. For this lemma, we use the events ExpCommitI and ExpRunningR,
and show that there is injective agreement between the two events on the param-
eters tidI , v and the session key material expSk (note that the session key material
changes between the different EDHOC methods).
Additionally, we require that injective agreementmust hold only when no long
term keymaterial for the two parties has been revealed before the end of the proto-
col. This is achieved by themain disjunction in lines 5-10 on the right of the implica-
tion, requiring to reveal the long term keys (i.e. one of the three LtkRev events must
trigger) if the responder has not been running amatching sessionwith the initiator.
1 lemma authIn jAgreeGuaranteeFor I :
2 a l l−t races
3 ” ∀ t i d I u v expSk # i .
4 ExpCommitI( t i d I , u , v , expSk )@i⇒
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5 ( ( ( ∃ t idR # j . ExpRunningR( t idR , v , expSk )@j ∧ # j < # i )
6 ∧ not ( ∃ t i d I 2 u2 v2 # i2 . ExpCommitI( t i d I 2 , u2 , v2 , expSk )@i2
7 ∧ not (# i = # i2 ) ) )
8 ∨ ( ∃ # j . LTKRev(〈u , v〉 )@j ∧ # j < # i )
9 ∨ ( ∃ # j . LTKRev(u )@j ∧ # j < # i )
10 ∨ ( ∃ # j . LTKRev(v )@j ∧ # j < # i ) ) ”
Note that this property does not hold when the initiator is running the STAT
method. For that case we need to prove implicit authentication, as detailed in the
next section.
Similarly to the previous lemma, we require that injective agreement also holds
in the reverse direction:
1 lemma authInjAgreeGuaranteeForR :
2 a l l−t races
3 ” ∀ t idR u v sk # i .
4 CommitR( t idR , u , v , sk )@i⇒
5 ( ( ( ∃ t i d I # j . RunningI ( t i d I , u , v , sk )@j ∧ # j < # i )
6 ∧ not ( ∃ t idR2 u2 v2 # i2 . CommitR( t idR2 , u2 , v2 , sk )@i2
7 ∧ not (# i = # i2 ) ) )
8 ∨ ( ∃ # j . LTKRev(〈u , v〉 )@j ∧ # j < # i )
9 ∨ ( ∃ # j . LTKRev(u )@j ∧ # j < # i )
10 ∨ ( ∃ # j . LTKRev(v )@j ∧ # j < # i ) ) ”
As the explicit and implicit authentication always correspond for the respon-
der authenticating with the initiator, here we do not need the additional Exp prefix
to the running and commit events (CommitI and CommitR respectively).
Implicit authentication The following lemma proves implicit authentication:
1 lemma authGIYImpl ic i tAuthGuaranteeFor I2 :
2 a l l−t races
3 ” ∀ t i d I u v impSk # i .
4 CommitI( t i d I , u , v , impSk )@i⇒
5 ( ( ∀ t idR u2 v2 # j . CommitR( t idR , u2 , v2 , impSk )@j⇒
6 (u = u2 ∧ v = v2 ∧ ∀ t idR2 u3 v3 # j2 .
7 CommitR( t idR2 , u3 , v3 , impSk )@j2⇒ # j = # j2 )
8 ∧ (not ∃ #k . K( impSk )@k) )
9 ∨ ( ∃ #k . LTKRev(u )@k)
10 ∨ ( ∃ #k . LTKRev(v )@k)
11 ∨ ( ∃ #k . LTKRev(〈u , v〉 )@k)
12 )
13 ”
As opposed to lemma authInjAgreeGuaranteeForI, here we prove that the two par-
ties implicitly authenticate on the keys impSk. In this lemmawe show that if any two
parties (u and v2 here) complete a run of the protocol, and u believes she is talking
to v and v2 believes he is talking to u2, then their identities match (that is, u =u2
and v =v2). Furthermore there is an injective correspondence between the CommitI
and CommitR events, and the attacker does not learn the session key material.
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Secrecy, Forward Secrecy and Session Key Independence Finally, we
prove secrecy of session keys, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and session key inde-
pendence. All these properties are validated by a unique lemma for each method,
as secrecy is a strictly weaker property than PFS (and hence follows directly),
and session key independence can be proven along PFS. This is done by allowing
the revelation of long term keys after either the initiator or the responder have
completed the protocol, and by allowing to reveal the session keys. It still holds
that the session keys are secret for all the other runs of the protocol.
First we show the lemma for the symmetric method:
1 lemma secrecyPFSGIYSessionKey:
2 a l l−t races
3 ” ( ∀ t i d u v sk # i # j . (K(sk )@i ∧ CommitI( t i d , u , v , sk )@j ) ⇒
4 (( ∃ # l . LTKRev(〈u , v〉 )@l ∧ # l < # j ) ∨ ( ∃ # l . SKRev(sk )@l ) ) ) ∧
5 ( ∀ t i d u v sk # i # j . (K(sk )@i ∧ CommitR( t i d , u , v , sk )@j ) ⇒
6 (( ∃ # l . LTKRev(〈u , v〉 )@l ∧ # l < # j ) ∨ ( ∃ # l . SKRev(sk )@l ) ) ) ”
Next we present the lemma for the asymmetric methods:
1 lemma secrecyPFSGIYSessionKey:
2 a l l−t races
3 ” ( ∀ t i d u v sk # i # j . (K(sk )@i ∧ CommitI( t i d , u , v , sk )@j ) ⇒
4 (( ∃ # l . LTKRev(u )@l ∧ # l < # j ) ∨ ( ∃ # l . LTKRev(v )@l ∧ # l < # j )
5 ∨ ( ∃ # l . SKRev(sk )@l ) ) ) ∧
6 ( ∀ t i d u v sk # i # j . (K(sk )@i ∧ CommitR( t i d , u , v , sk )@j ) ⇒
7 (( ∃ # l . LTKRev(u )@l ∧ # l < # j ) ∨ ( ∃ # l . LTKRev(v )@l ∧ # l < # j )
8 ∨ ( ∃ # l . SKRev(sk )@l ) ) ) ”
4 Discussion
4.1 Unclear protocol use
In this section we discuss why formal verification of industrial standards aiming
for general purpose use, like EDHOC often is difficult because their goals are
vague [1]. The basic premise for EDHOC is simple: establish an OSCORE security
context with few roundtrips and small messages. Starting from there, the design of
EDHOC seems to bemainly driven bywhat can be achieved given certain technical
restrictions.
There is a clash between formal verification activities, which aims to verify
whether well-specified security goals are met within a given security model, and
an industrial standard, where the overall goal is clear, but lacks specificity. Fur-
ther, the clash is emphasized by that formal verification requires settling on specific
security models, in terms of attacker capabilities, assumptions on storage and pro-
cessing by parties etc., whereas, the security model in industrial standards often
arises from resistance to attacks identified attacks during the design. The latter
makes the assumptions required for the protocol unclear and hard to verify. In
our analysis we have made assumptions we believe represent useful models, and
extracted properties that EDHOC has or does not have. On the one hand, this
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approach is aligned with the basic premises that EDHOC should establish an
OSCORE security context with generally useful security properties. On the other,
without a clearer picture of the intended uses of the protocol, whether these prop-
erties, or the ones claimed in the specification are the most important ones for
constrained IoT use cases cannot be determined.
Similarly to (D)TLS, EDHOC is intended to solve a variety of use cases, many
not known today, and therefore, it is not possible to collect all types of use cases
that need to be considered. However, this is not a valid argument against collecting
typical use cases and user stories to capture at least some of the security properties
a solution must exhibit.
Having a better understanding of the security properties required by these
use cases would clearly help, not only verification activities, but also guiding the
design of EDHOC. It may also help reducing the number of methods to only the
ones that are needed. The current security model is vague and largely implicitly
defined by attacks that the protocol should withstand, so better understanding
the intended use of EDHOC would also help in defining a clearer security model.
We propose that the application usage of EDHOC is better explored via user
stories or use cases to identify security properties that are most commonly needed,
or are essential for important applications. In fact, while constructing our model,
we came up with simple user stories to identify security properties of interest.
Several of these revealed undefined aspects of EDHOC that were then included in
the specification. We now give a few examples to demonstrate where some of our
use cases and user stories uncovered blind spots in the specification.
Credentials stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE) The question is
whether there will be applications where the device is deployed in a hostile envi-
ronment, and where it is reasonable to assume it can be equipped with a TEE. In
our analysis we have chosen not to model TEEs, by making use of session state
reveal queries. This is because we received indications from the specification au-
thors (personal correspondence) that it was not necessary to consider reveal of
the session state, in particular the ephemeral secret keys, with the rationale that
SIGMA cannot protect against such an attack (presumably based on the fact that
the SIG-SIG method is closely based on SIGMA-I and that it would be preferable
to obtain some kind of homogeneity among the EDHOC methods when it comes
to what security properties they provide). That argument is however only true if
one restricts attention to session key confidentiality of an ongoing session. TEEs
do provide value by, for example, allowing weak PCS guarantees. Further, for pro-
tocols in the style of OPTLS, on which the STAT-based methods are modeled, a
static long-term key and an ephemeral one are typically mixed to obtain the ses-
sion key material. This design is intentional, especially in the OPTLS case, where
the protocol is designed to be provably secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model.
Non-repudiation An access control solution for a nuclear power-plant may need
to log who is passing through a door, whereas it may be undesirable for, say, a
coffee machine to log a list of people and their coffee preferences. When we did
that simple thought experiment we caught that the specification did not consider
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non-repudiation. The authors of the specification added a paragraph about which
methods providedwhich types of (non)-repudiation in response. It would, however,
be helpful for application developers to also document example use cases show-
ing the consequences of choosing the different methods, perhaps in the security
considerations section.
4.2 Security claims
The specification makes a number of detailed claims about the properties that the
protocol provides (see Section 8.1 [25]). The intention may be that if the academic
protocol SIGMA is re-used as a cryptographic core of EDHOC, then all the prop-
erties listed in the paper analyzing SIGMA [4] are the necessary and sufficient
ones and can be copied into the specification. (Note: presumably the intention is
the same for the other reused cryptographic cores based on OPTLS and Noise,
but since the specification is still work in progress, it is not yet written down).
Section 8.1. states “EDHOC inherits its security properties from the theoretical
SIGMA-I”. Designing a standard specification by re-using existing well-studied
academic components is good practice. But when doing so, it is important to re-
late any changes made to the referred cryptographic core or give justification as
to why the changes are appropriate. Otherwise, one cannot draw the conclusions
that a protocol inherits properties from another. The specification may not be the
appropriate place for such analysis, but strong claims about security properties
require justification.
4.3 Unintended authentication confusion
Section 3.2 of the specification states that a parties are required to be configured
with a policy restricting the set of peers an they are allowed to run EDHOC with.
The intention is to configure groups which devices are allowed to connect to. How-
ever, because the initiator is not required to verify that the ID CRED R received
in message 2 is the same as the one the application intended when initiating the
EDHOC run, this is insufficient for a general purpose key exchange protocol. The
following thought experiment shows why.
Assume someone has configured all devices in their home to be in the allowed
set of devices, but that one of the devices A has been compromised. If another
device B, unaware of the compromise, initiates a connection to a third device C,
the compromised device A may interfere. A may respond in C’s place, blocking
the legitimate response from C. Since B does not check that it is C’s identity in
message 2, and device A is part of the allowed set, B will complete and accept the
EDHOC run with device A instead of the intended C.
The obvious solution is for the initiator to match ID CRED R to the intended
identity provided by the application. Note that it is insufficient to let EDHOC
report to the application which identity it established a security context with,
because, even though the application could reject the connection when there is
a mismatch, the application must be able to instruct EDHOC to not accept the
same identity in the next attempt, or there would be an infinite loop.
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This is yet another example of where a small user story uncovers potential lacks
in the specification, and shows that it would be a useful for standardization to ex-
plore such and which security properties they reveal suitable for EDHOC to have.
4.4 Session key material
EDHOC establishes a session key state as output, from which session keys for
OSCORE can be derived using HKDF. As discussed in Section 3.1, there are
various possibilities for defining which parameters from the EDHOC run should
provide the secret input to the session key state.
While we showbidirectional injective agreement onG X andG Y for allmethods,
initiators cannot obtain injective agreement on G IY when using the STAT method
themselves. Therefore,G IY cannot be considered part of the keymaterial if mutual
injective agreement is considered an important property for EDHOC. Excluding
G IY would deviate from OPTLS, which is the cryptographic core used for these
methods. Specifically, the proof of session key confidentiality in the face of long-
term key compromise for OPTLS cannot be adapted for EDHOC because the
underlying assumption thatG IY is part of the keymaterialwould no longer be true.
Other security properties of OPTLS may also fail to be true if G IY were excluded.
Another option is to include a fourth message from responder to initiator car-
rying a message authentication code using a key derived from session key material
including G IY. This would give the initiator sufficient guarantee that the respon-
der indeed uses the same G IY as the initiator. The cost is an additional message,
and our understanding is that this is unacceptable (personal correspondence with
the specification authors).
In some use-cases there will be a such as message as part of the subsequent
OSCORE protocol run. It would, however, create an additional dependence be-
tween the two protocols, increasing complexity and the risk for insecure imple-
mentations.
Yet another option is to include G I, a hash of it, or a hash of ID CRED I if there
is a one-to-one mapping between ID CRED I and G I, in messages one and two. This
would however increase message sizes, a grave concern for EDHOC, and would
prevent initiator identity protection. While identity protection is important in
general, the specification nor the requirements document give any rationale why
the initiator’s identity would be more important to protect compared to the re-
sponder’s. The specification states that the initiator’s identity is protected against
active attacks and the responder’s against passive attacks, but that the roles should
be assigned to the CoAP peers to protect the most sensitive identity the most (see
Section 8 [25]). Roles could hence be swapped, so identity protection is not a strong
argument against this option.
We have shown implicit agreement on G X, G Y for all methods, and also on
G IY and G RX when these are used, see Section 3. If this weaker security guarantee
is sufficient, both ephemeral and long-term keys can be part of the session key
material. Whether it is sufficient or not, depends on the intended uses of EDHOC.
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4.5 Cipher suite negotiation
Cipher suite negotiation in EDHOC spans two or more executions of the protocol.
That is, an initiator keeps state between protocol runs and proposes an updated set
of cipher suites if the first run resulted in a rejection of the cipher suite from the re-
sponder (see Section 2). Our model does not cover this and leave it for future work.
We note that keeping state between protocol runs implicitly creates a long-lived
meta-session covering multiple EDHOC sessions. While the spirit of the descrip-
tion in Section 4.2.2 of the specification is that within some kind of meta-session,
presumably controlled by an application, there is a re-negotiation due to cipher
suite mismatch between the initator and responder, the specification does not de-
scribe for how long the initator should remember a rejected cipher suite for a given
party. From a security perspective, remembering the rejected cipher suite for the
next EDHOC run within a given application session would be sufficient. It would
also result in that, if the responder is updated with a new cipher suite before the
next application session, this would be taken into account. On the other hand,
caching the rejected cipher suite between application sessions would reduce the
number of round-trips for subsequent runs, should the responder not have been
updated. Regardless, these considerations would be helpful to cover in the security
considerations section of the specification.
5 Conclusions
We have formally modeled all the five methods of the EDHOC key establishment
protocol using the Tamarin tool. Using themodel, we identified and defined several
important security properties and verified these. We also identified security prop-
erties that does not hold for all methods. Most importantly, injective agreement
on G IY does not hold for initiators when they use the STAT method, so this prop-
erty cannot be claimed for the entire key material in those situations. Further, we
identified a situation where initiators may establish an OSCORE security context
with a different party than the application using EDHOC intended, and proposed
a simple mitigation. We discussed possible actions that IETF may take to extract
and better define security properties to make better use of verification techniques.
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